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Abstract
We analyse fiscal devaluation in a three-country model. The introduction of the
third country, outside a monetary union, increases the expansionary effect of fiscal
devaluation and the second country of the monetary union experiences a boom
instead of a recession.
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21. Introduction
Fiscal devaluations have been discussed in the recent literature as an alternative macroeconomic
stabilization tool to a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate for countries in a monetary union
(MU).1 With the exchange rate fixed vis-à-vis their MU partner countries, a country-specific recession
can be mitigated and a current account deficit be reduced by a reduction of the social security
contribution (SSC) rate and an offsetting increase of the value-added tax (VAT) rate that makes the
policy revenue neutral. So far, this policy has been intensively analysed in calibrated small open
economy or 2-country models of a MU. What has been missing so far, and what this paper contributes,
is an explicit analysis of repercussions of a third country outside the MU.
Engler et al. (2017, henceforth EGTV) have shown in a New Keynesian DSGE model of a 2-country MU
calibrated to the Eurozone (with a “core” and a “periphery” country, the latter conducting a fiscal
devaluation) that if SSC paid by employers are reduced and if nominal wages are sufficiently rigid,
firms’ real marginal costs of production and inflation decline and the terms of trade deteriorate. The
MU’s central bank reacts by reducing the real rates of interest boosting consumption, net exports and
output in the fiscally depreciating country. The trade balance relative to GDP rises slightly. In contrast,
the core suffers from a recession because of a fall in net exports.
In this paper, we add a third country outside the MU with a flexible exchange rate to the model of
EGTV. This extension increases the expansionary effects on output in the fiscally depreciating country
by  10  basis  points  in  the  peak  to  1.33%  while  the  core,  rather  than  suffering  from  a  recession,
experiences a small expansion of 0.13%. From the perspective of the MU, and in contrast to the finding
of EGTV, fiscal devaluations are thus a free lunch regarding the output effects. Furthermore, the MU’s
trade is further boosted: In the periphery, net exports increase more while the core country’s net
exports decline by almost 70% less. The conclusion drawn in EGTV that fiscal devaluations are an
inadequate tool to reverse trade imbalances is thus slightly weakened with respect to the periphery
but strengthened with respect to the core.
2. The model
In  this  section,  we provide a  brief  overview of  the model.  The details  and the parametrization are
relegated  to  the  appendix.  The  analysis  is  based  on  a  New  Keynesian  DSGE  model  of  the  world
economy that is normalized to size 1 consisting of two countries forming a MU and a third country
whose currency is floating vis-à-vis the monetary union’s currency. We denote those countries
1 See Engler et al. (2017), Farhi et al. (2014), Gomes et al. (2016), Hohberger and Kraus (2016) for journal
publications and Bank of Portugal (2011), Boscá et al. (2012), CPB (2013), Lipinska and von Thadden (2012) and
de Mooij and Keen (2013) for working papers and book chapters.
3“periphery”, “core”, and “rest of the world”, their relative sizes are ݊, ݉ − ݊ and 1 − ݉ respectively
with ݊,݉ ∈ [0,1]. The economies are populated by representative households who derive (dis-)utility
from consumption, ܥ௧	 	, and hours worked, ௧ܰ	 . In the periphery2, this is ࣯௧	 = ॱ௧ ∑ ߚ௦ൣlog ܥ௧ା௦	 −ஶ௦ୀ଴( ௧ܰା௦	 )ଵାథ/(1 + ߶)൧,	with rational expectations operator ॱ௧  and preference parameters ߚ and ߶.
Households face the budget constraint(1 + ߬௧௏஺்) ௧ܲ	ܥ௧	 + ܤ௧஼௢௥௘ + ܧ௧ܤ௧ோ௢ௐ = ܴ௧ିଵெ௎ܤ௧ିଵ஼௢௥௘ + ܴ௧ିଵோ௢ௐܧ௧ܤ௧ିଵோ௢ௐ + ௧ܹ	 ௧ܰ	 + ߎ௧	 + ௧ܶ	,
where ߬௧௏஺்  is the (country-specific) VAT rate that applies to all goods consumed within the country,
௧ܲ
	  the consumer price level, ܤ௧஼௢௥௘  and ܤ௧ோ௢ௐ  are, respectively, bonds issued by core and rest of the
world households and held by the periphery household, ܧ௧ is the nominal exchange rate between the
MU and the rest of the world, ܴ௧ିଵெ௎ 	and ܴ௧ିଵோ௢ௐ  are the nominal interest rates set by the respective
central banks, ௧ܹ	 is the nominal wage, Π௧	  are firms’ profits and ௧ܶ	 are lump-sum transfers.
Aggregate consumption of the periphery, ܥ௧	 , is the following:
ܥ௧
	 = ቈ߱ଵఙ 	ܥ௉௘௥,௧ఙିଵఙ + (߸ −߱)ଵఙ 	ܥ஼௢௥௘ ,௧ఙିଵఙ + (1 − ߸)ଵఙ 	ܥோ௢ௐ,௧ఙିଵఙ ቉ ఙఙିଵ ,	
where ܥ௉௘௥ ,௧, ܥ஼௢௥௘ ,௧ 	and ܥோ௢ௐ ,௧ are indexes of the periphery’s, the core’s and the rest of the world’s
goods, ߱ is the share of the periphery’s goods in the periphery’s consumption, ߸− ߱	is the share of
the core’s goods, 1 −߸ is the share of the rest of the world’s goods and ߪ is the (Armington) elasticity
of substitution between goods produced in different countries. Households allocate aggregate
consumption intertemporally by an Euler equation while wages and employment are determined by
trade unions that take account of the household’s marginal rate of substitution (see Erceg et al., 2000).
The continuum of firms is indexed with ݅ which produce output, ௧ܻ	(݅), with labor as the only factor
input according to the linear production function ௧ܻ	(݅) = ௧ܰ	(݅). Therefore, each firm ݅ combines
differentiated labor, supplied by households and indexed with ݖ, to an aggregate labor input ௧ܰ	(݅)
used in the production of good ݅ and pay wages set by monopolistically competitive unions. Firms
themselves operate under monopolistic competition, both prices and wages are set in a staggered
fashion a la Calvo (1983). Firms pay country specific distortionary SSC, ߬௧ௌௌ஼ ,  on wages so that their
profits, Π௧(݅) = ௧ܲ	(݅) ௧ܻ	(݅) − (1 + ߬௧ௌௌ஼)∫ ௧ܹ	(ݖ) ௧ܰ	(݅, ݖ)݀ݖ௡଴ , are directly affected by the SSC rate.
Tax revenues from the VAT and SSC are rebated to households in the form of lump-sum transfers so
that the government budget constraint ௧ܶ	 = ߬௧௏஺் ௧ܲ	ܥ௧	 + ߬௧ௌௌ஼ 	 ௧ܹ	 ௧ܰ	  holds. The VAT- and SSC-rate
changes in the periphery are implemented by zero mean, unanticipated “shocks” ߝ௧௏஺் 	and	ߝ௧ௌௌ஼  and
2 Core and RoW are described by according equations.
4follow AR(1)-processes in the (absolute) deviations from their steady state values (indicated by hats,
i.e. ߬௧ෝ
௏஺் 	and	߬௧ෝ ௌ஼ோ respectively), 	߬௧ෞ௝ = ߩ௝߬௧ିଵෞ ௝ + ߝ௧௝  with ݆ = ܸܣܶ, ܵܵܥ	and ߩ௝ 	 ∈ [0,1]. A fiscal
devaluation is calibrated as an unanticipated highly persistent (de facto permanent) reduction of the
periphery country’s SSC rate that reduces revenues worth one percent of its ex-post GDP which is
exactly offset by an increase in the VAT rate. Central banks set nominal interest rates proportional to
the consumer price inflation and to past interest rates.
The parameters of the model are set to mimic the “Eurozone periphery” (Greece, Italy, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain) that makes up roughly a third of the Eurozone GDP and the remaining Eurozone
countries denoting the core and the overall Eurozone constituting roughly 20 percent of world GDP.
3. Results
Figure 1 compares the effects of the fiscal devaluation enacted in the periphery for the 3-country
model with that of the 2-country setting of EGTV. The peak output, consumption and trade balance
increases in the periphery country rise from 1.21%, 0.73% and 0.27% of GDP to 1.33%, 0.79% and 0.3%
of GDP respectively. The fiscal devaluation thus serves as an even better tool to stimulate output and
consumption while the trade effect is a bit larger when the third country is included. The finding of
EGTV with respect to the periphery is thus reinforced. At the same time the initial output contraction
observed in the core in the 2-country setting turns into a small boom with an initial peak of 0.13%
lasting for seven quarters in the 3-country setting. The increase in consumption is mitigated but this is
more than offset by a deterioration of the trade balance that is 70% smaller (-0.043% instead of -
0.141%). The inclusion of a third country thus serves to cushion the MU core from this policy and hence
overturns  the  finding  of  EGTV  that  the  spillover  effects  to  the  core  constitute  a  cost  of  fiscal
devaluations to the MU.3
The reason for these effects are as follows: The periphery benefits from being a relatively smaller
country in a 3-country world than in a 2-country world so that the foreign price reaction will be smaller
and,  c.p.,  a  given fall  in  domestic  goods prices  will  deteriorate  the terms of  trade more,  boost  net
exports more and thereby generate a bigger wealth effect raising consumption even more. The core
country benefits from a deterioration of its terms of trade vis-à-vis the rest of the world because of a
nominal depreciation of the exchange rate boosting exports and thereby countering the fall in exports
to the MU periphery. This increases hours worked, nominal wages and inflation so that the long-run
3 A brief discussion on the sensitivity of results w.r.t. key parameters is presented in the appendix. If the
Armington elasticity is 2 (1), we find a decrease (increase) in the core’s output in a 2-country setup. Our choice
of setting this parameter to 2 is motivated by recent empirical studies (Feenstra et al. 2017 and Imbs and
Mejean 2015) suggesting values that are even higher than 2; by the empirical behavior of the trade balance and
the terms of trade that our model is able to replicate; and because EGTV use it.
5real rate of interest falls less and consumption rises less. But the effect on trade is larger than the effect
on consumption so that output rises while it contracts in the 2-country setting.
6Figure 1: Impulse responses to a fiscal devaluation in the periphery
Note: Dashed lines appertain to the 2-country model, solid lines to the 3-country model. Inflation
rates are annualized and expressed in percentage points. Interest rates are expressed in annualized
basis point deviations. Deviations of trade balances are expressed in percentage of steady state
output. For all other variables we report percentage deviations from their steady state values.
The deflation generated in the MU is exported to the rest of the world and with it the loose monetary
policy stance. Rest of the world consumption rises but output contracts slightly.
4. Conclusion
We have shown that the inclusion of a third country into an otherwise standard model of a MU with
two member countries changes the effects of a fiscal devaluation in an important way: It strengthens
the stimulus in the economy that implements the fiscal devaluation and, more importantly, turns a
recession into a small boom in the second MU member country. The policy is thus costless with respect
to output.
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